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The U.S. government has responded to the increase of financial crimes,
including money laundering and terrorist financing, by requiring that
financial institutions implement anti-money laundering compliance
programs within their institutions. Most recently, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network exercised its regulatory powers, as authorized by the
Treasury Department, by proposing regulations that now explicitly add
customer due diligence to the preexisting anti-money laundering regime.
The policy behind the government’s legislative and regulatory measures is
clear—financial institutions must ensure that they are protected from and
not aiding in the illegal efforts of criminals. The complexity and
insidiousness of these financial crimes makes it difficult for the government
to act solely and without the compliance of financial institutions. Although
national security and the protection of the global economy are urgent
priorities, all legislative actions or considerations need to be sensitive to
personal privacy.
This Note examines the criminal activity and legislative history that has
necessitated the proposal of such regulations, the burdens that compliance
places on financial institutions, and the technology that aids these financial
institutions in their compliance efforts. As a result of these compliance
obligations and the potential penalties for non-compliance, customer
privacy is not always guaranteed. Existing privacy laws do not sufficiently
ensure that customer financial information is adequately protected; rather,
these privacy laws allow privacy invasions for the sake of compliance with
anti-money laundering legislation and, as a result, are often inadequate
and insufficient when compared to international privacy schemes. It is
important to find a balance between the need to protect national security,
the requirements placed on financial institutions, and the rights customers
have to financial privacy. The global nature of financial networks and of
these illicit activities warrants concerted efforts by governments
domestically and abroad to ensure that compliance does not result in
unwarranted financial privacy invasions.
Until a global system can be established, this Note proposes that the
currently proposed regulations be amended to mandate privacy programs
within financial institutions. Financial institutions should develop privacy
policies and procedures that will work with their already existing anti-
money laundering compliance programs and should ensure that their
compliance and privacy focused personnel coordinate their efforts so that
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regulatory compliance neither detrimentally impacts the way they conduct
their business nor betrays their customers’ right to privacy.
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of May 2, 2011, President Barack Obama addressed the
United States and the world to report that the United States successfully
“conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al
Qaeda, and [the] terrorist . . . responsible for the murder of thousands of
innocent men, women, and children.”1 Unfortunately, this announcement
did not bring an end to terrorism. The news today is flooded with reports on
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or the Levant (Islamic State),2 a
terrorist group with a “nihilistic view and genocidal agenda.”3 David
Cohen, the Treasury Department’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, acknowledged that the Islamic State might be the
best-funded terrorist group ever confronted.4 The Islamic State is a different
type of beast. It has not responded to typical efforts to cut terrorist financing
through the international system, specifically because of its quick
adaptability to disruptions to its illicit activities and funding.5 The U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) has estimated that in
2014, the Islamic State made about one to three million dollars per day.6 Its
funding comes from oil, donations from “wealthy sympathizers,”7
kidnappings, and “unregistered charitable organizations.”8 The Treasury
Department has sanctioned individuals that have financed the Islamic State
and other terrorist groups.9 However, it still remains uncertain what impact
these sanctions actually have, because much of the Islamic State’s funds are
derived from criminal activities. As it stands, these sanctions are “designed
1. Macon Phillips, Osama Bin Laden Dead, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 2, 2011, 12:16
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead.
2. See, e.g., Ray Sanchez, ISIS, ISIL or the Islamic State?, CNN (Jan. 23, 2015, 6:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/meast/isis-isil-islamic-state/index.html. The group’s name
varies by those using it. The Government has referred to the terrorist group as ISIL, while much of
the media uses ISIS. The group refers to itself as the Islamic State.
3. John Kerry, To Defeat Terror, We Need the World’s Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2014, at
A21.




7. Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Self-Funded and Deep-Rooted: How ISIS Makes its
Millions, CNN: WORLD (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/is
is-funding/.
8. Swanson, supra note 4.
9. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Treasury Imposes Terrorism Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/middleeast/treasury-imposes-terrorism-sanctio
ns-on-those-linked-to-islamic-state.html.
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to publicly expose key players in the group, with the goal of isolating them
and restricting their access to money and freedom of movement.”10
Government efforts to deter terrorist financing and money laundering
are not new. In 1970, Congress enacted the first of its anti-money
laundering (AML) legislation, the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).11
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11) against the United
States, President Bush signed the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).12 Title III of the Patriot Act, the International
Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001,
amended the BSA and focused on money laundering and terrorist
financing.13 Under the BSA, as amended by Title III of the Patriot Act, the
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue regulations establishing
AML programs within financial institutions to assist with various matters,
including counterterrorism.14
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is a bureau
within the Treasury Department that “safeguard[s] the financial system
from illicit use and combat[s] money laundering and promote[s] national
security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial
intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.”15 FinCEN’s Director
has been authorized by the Treasury Department to “implement, administer,
and enforce compliance with the BSA and associated regulations.”16
FinCEN, recently proposed rules that impose various reporting
requirements and obligations on financial institutions, including mandatory
customer due diligence (CDD) procedures for the purpose of assisting with
BSA compliance efforts.17 FinCEN’s proposed rules now explicitly
mandate that financial institutions know their customers because “both who
they are and what transactions they conduct—is a critical aspect of
combating all forms of illicit financial activity,” which includes terrorist
financing and “the evasion to more traditional financial crimes.”18 These
rules, though necessary for combating financial crimes, pose a danger to
client privacy rights, despite having the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
10. Id.
11. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 31 U.S.C.).
12. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)).
13. Id.
14. What We Do, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY: FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,151,
45,152 (proposed Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
18. Id.
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(GLBA)19 in place to deal with financial privacy. Congress, in Title V of the
GLBA, acknowledged that financial institutions have a duty to respect and
protect the privacy of their customers.20 Though the GLBA protects privacy
rights in certain respects, it permits financial reporting to comply with
FinCEN’s requests.21
Because of the sophistication of terrorist groups like the Islamic State,
distinguishing the legitimacy of funding to terrorist groups is not easy.22 For
example, donations “from the Persian Gulf and other sympathetic corners of
the world, witnessing the humanitarian crisis in Syria, have been funneling
money to the most effective forces fighting . . . [the Islamic State].”23
Determining whether funds have been transferred for the purposes of aiding
Syrian refugees or supporting terrorism has proven difficult.24 As two
experts in the field have explained in a New York Times editorial:
[The Islamic State] is also a leader in using new technologies and social
media to raise awareness and reach individual donors. Appeals for
donations (or investments) are tweeted while money is raised and sent via
the Internet, then withdrawn in the form of bags of cash to be transported
into the war zones . . . . If we hope to constrict these global and local fund-
raising streams, and the dangerous ambitions of terrorist groups, we need a
renewed campaign against terrorist financing.25
As these terrorist groups continue to develop and become more
sophisticated, the U.S. government will need to advance its initiatives
combating terrorist financing and money laundering. In fact, this process
has already begun. Many government agencies, and now even financial
institutions, have been using computerized technology such as that provided
by Palantir Technologies, Inc. (Palantir).26 Palantir provides data mining
and analysis programs that can assist the government with counterterrorism
efforts27 and help with “unraveling complex financial crimes.”28 Because of
Palantir’s superior technological capabilities, it can quickly assist financial
19. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
20. Id. § 501(a)
21. David E. Teitelbaum & Karl F. Kaufmann, Current Developments in Anti-Money
Laundering Laws, 58 BUS. L. 1149, 1155 (2002).
22. See Juan C. Zarate & Thomas M. Sanderson, How the Terrorists Got Rich: In Iraq and






26. PALANTIR, https://www.palantir.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
27. Ashlee Vance & Brad Stone, Palantir, the War on Terror’s Secret Weapon, BUS. WK.
MAG. (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/palantir-the-vanguard-of-
cyberterror-security-11222011.html.
28. About, PALANTIR, http://www.palantir.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
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institutions in their compliance efforts. This leaves open the question of
how well privacy is really protected since neither the GLBA nor FinCEN’s
proposed rules adequately address this problem.
Regulators and financial institutions must be constantly vigilant in
balancing their concurrent obligations to navigate between the Scylla of
compliance, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of privacy obligations to
customers, on the other.29 While national security is of utmost importance,
the protection of client privacy rights is also imperative and must not be
quickly disregarded. The government should consider these privacy
interests when refining its AML laws.
This Note examines the privacy law implications facing financial
institutions’ adoption of CDD programs consistent with FinCEN’s proposed
regulations. Part I of this Note examines the legislative history behind
FinCEN’s proposed rules, which attempt to establish a uniform system of
CDD requirements for financial institutions, and then analyze them. Part II
discusses the current requirements that require financial institutions to know
their customers, and will review Palantir as a new tool that financial
institutions increasingly use to aggregate the information necessary to
comply with AML program requirements. Part III analyzes the history of
financial privacy rights, focusing on the GLBA, and then will discuss the
potential invasions of customer privacy that may result from complying
with CDD regulations. This Note concludes that because more coherent and
standardized regulation of privacy in the United States seems unlikely,
FinCEN should take active steps to mandate all financial institutions to
have privacy groups responsible for testing and auditing their institution’s
compliance procedures and policies to ensure that they more diligently
safeguard customer privacy in conformity with international privacy law.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. AMLLEGISLATION’S BEGINNINGS
The increasing rampancy of illicit activity from money laundering,
terrorist financing, and drug trafficking—nationally and globally—has
compromised financial institutions and necessitated the creation of
legislation intended to safeguard against such crimes.30 Initially, the
Treasury Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, and
29. Scylla and Charybdis, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/530331/Scylla-and-Charybdis (last updated June 16,
2015). Scylla and Charybdis are “two immortal and irresistible monsters who beset the narrow
waters traversed by the hero Odysseus in his wanderings described in Homer’s, Odyssey, Book
XII . . . . To be “between Scylla and Charybdis” means to be caught between two equally
unpleasant alternatives.” Id.
30. See Mark E. Plotkin & B.J. Sanford, Patriot Act: Customer’s View of “Know Your
Customer”—Section 326 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, 1 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 670, 671 (2006).
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Department of Justice lobbied Congress for legislation requiring banks to
keep records that would assist with their fight against organized crime.31
While concerns about the potential invasion of financial privacy and the
burden on financial institutions were considered, Congress quickly
devalued their importance as “law enforcement concerns . . . outweighed
the burden[s] to financial institutions.”32
As a result, the BSA was enacted and is considered “the fundamental
U.S. statute aimed at deterring and detecting . . . financial crimes.”33
Originally, under the BSA, banks were required to maintain records34 that
would assist with investigations and proceedings related to financial
crimes.35 Specifically, “[t]he BSA was designed to help identify the source,
volume, and movement of currency and other monetary instruments
transported or transmitted into or out of the United States or deposited in
financial institutions.”36 The BSA’s requirements for AML compliance
programs within financial institutions were supposed to help the
government and its regulators work toward achieving their goals of
ultimately protecting against the increase in financial crimes.37 Inconsistent
application of these requirements, however, meant that BSA’s actual impact
was hardly felt for the first ten years after its enactment.38 In response to its
“ineffectiveness,” Congress responded by enacting a multitude of other
money laundering legislation.39 Much like the BSA, however, the costs and
effort that compliance with such legislation requires continue to burden the
financial industry and have yet to be proven effective.40
As the evolving climate with respect to financial crimes prompted the
enactment of legislation and, in turn, active government involvement, a
need for more stringent regulation of financial institutions led to the
31. Daniel Mulligan, Comment, Know Your Customer Regulations and the International
Banking System: Towards a General Self-Regulatory Regime, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2324, 2336
(1998).
32. Id. at 2338.
33. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 671.
34. Statutes & Regulations: Bank Secrecy Act, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY: FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, www.FinCEN.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2015). The
BSA “requires financial institutions to keep records of cash purchases of negotiable instruments,
file reports of cash transactions exceeding $10,000 (daily aggregate amount), and to report
suspicious activity that might signify money laundering, tax evasion, or other criminal activities.”
Id.
35. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 671.
36. FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 7 (2010) [hereinafter FFIEC MANUAL],
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/bsa_aml_man_2010.pdf.
37. See id.
38. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2340.
39. Id. at 2340–44 (discussing the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988).
40. Id. at 2344.
2016] The Sixth Pillar of Anti-Money Laundering Compliance 501
proposed “Know Your Customer” (KYC) regulations.41 KYC guidelines
were not codified, but the Treasury Department still delegated authority to
federal agencies to require that financial institutions establish and maintain
internal procedures in compliance with the BSA reporting requirements.42
Initial efforts at mandating KYC regulations obligated financial institutions
to identify customers and the sources of their funds, analyze transactional
behaviors of customers, monitor customer activity against patterns, and
report suspicious activities or discrepancies in patterns to the government.43
Failure to act carefully and diligently in implementation of these
requirements resulted in criminal and civil liability for financial
institutions.44 The concern regarding the financial burdens imposed on
financial institutions,45 when coupled with the increased potential for
criminal liability,46 resulted in “overwhelming public opposition” to the
KYC regulations.47 Ultimately, the concern that KYC obligations would
result in a “massive invasion of financial privacy” led to withdrawal of the
KYC proposals.48 Despite their withdrawal, the concern remains, “as KYC
principles are imbedded in the U.S. anti-money laundering regime.”49 As
such, many financial institutions have voluntarily adopted these measures,
viewing them as necessary to ensure their compliance with the suspicious
activity reporting requirements that federal regulators impose.50 The
regulatory outlook for financial institutions became even more burdensome
following the terrorist attacks on 9/11.
9/11 prompted further action by the U.S. government. Congress enacted
the Patriot Act51 five weeks after these attacks, with the intention of
“providing law enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools to deter and
apprehend terrorists.”52 Title III of the Patriot Act amended the BSA by
imposing additional requirements originally considered prior to 9/11,
41. Financial Privacy, Reporting Requirements Under the Bank Secrecy Act and the “Know
Your Customer” Regulations: Hearing Before the H. General Oversight/Financial Institutions
Subcommittees Joint Hearing on Bank Secrecy Act Reporting Requirements, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Gregory Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) [hereinafter
Financial Privacy Hearing], https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/financial-privacy-
reporting-requirements-under-bank-secrecy-act.
42. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2359.
43. Financial Privacy Hearing, supra note 41.
44. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2364.
45. H.R. REP. NO. 101-446, at 25 (1990) (stating that “Congress must recognize that
compliance by the financial community with the Bank Secrecy Act is difficult and costly”).
46. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2364.
47. Financial Privacy Hearing, supra note 41; see also Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2364–65
(discussing the “overwhelming negative reactions to the proposed regulations.”).
48. Financial Privacy Hearing, supra note 41.
49. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2326 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (1999)).
50. Financial Privacy Hearing, supra note 41.
51. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)).
52. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 670.
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“transform[ing] the BSA enforcement climate and elevat[ing] the rigor with
which existing BSA requirements were applied.”53 Against the emotional
backdrop of 9/11, enactment of Title III allowed for the implementation of
KYC processes that had been widely criticized prior to 9/11.54 Specifically,
section 326 of Title III authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish
regulations that would force financial institutions to discharge reasonable
procedures designed to verify customer identity at account opening,
maintain records of information necessary for customer identification, and
compare identified persons to known lists of suspected terrorists provided
by government agencies.55
In 2003, FinCEN, along with various agencies, issued joint final rules56
that implemented section 326 of the Patriot Act, and required financial
institutions to establish a Customer Identification Program (CIP) within
their institutions.57 CIP requires sufficient customer identification at
account opening and appropriate procedures to verify customer identities.58
In addition to CIP procedures, financial institutions must collect any
customer information that will assist with CDD compliance.59 CDD, unlike
the CIP requirement, is not explicitly required by section 326 of the Patriot
Act, “but rather is imposed on [financial institutions] by their regulators as
part of the supervisory process.”60 Because CDD procedures are not
specifically mandated by regulation, there is a lack of consistency with
respect to the policies and procedures used among financial institutions
when implementing them.61 It is with this legislative and regulatory
background that FinCEN’s recently proposed CDD rules must be analyzed.
B. FINCEN AND ITSRECENTLY PROPOSEDRULES
FinCEN commenced operations in 1990 and provides an analytical
network across U.S. government agencies that aids in domestic and
53. Id. at 671.
54. See id. at 672 (discussing 9/11’s “political momentum” in allowing for KYC’s re-
consideration).
55. USA PATRIOT Act § 326.
56. Joint Final Rule: Customer Identification Program for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit
Unions and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,090 (2003).
57. John Coyle, The Legality of Banking the Undocumented, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 21, 26
(2007).
58. The Bank Secrecy Act and the USA PATRIOT Act Before H. Comm. on Int’l Rel., 108th
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter BSA Hearing] (testimony of Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate
Director of Banking Supervision and Regulation), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testi
mony/2004/20041117/ (“The CIP must include account-opening procedures that specify the
identifying information that will be obtained from each customer, and it must include reasonable
and practical risk-based procedures for verifying the customer’s identity.”).
59. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 677.
60. Id.
61. See id. (stating that “each bank has been left to devise its own CDD program based on a
mix of guidance from regulators, advice from counsel and consultants, and the lessons of its own
experience”).
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international law enforcement efforts against financial crimes (e.g., money
laundering and terrorist financing).62 With its investigative functions comes
the responsibility to collect and analyze financial information that will
enable it to generate suspect lists to provide to the appropriate law
enforcement agency.63 FinCEN also has regulatory powers that come from
the BSA:
which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to require
financial institutions to keep records and file reports that ‘have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal . . . investigations or proceedings, or in
the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, . . . to protect
against international terrorism.’ The Secretary has delegated to the
Director of FinCEN the authority to implement, administer and enforce
compliance with the BSA and associated regulations.64
In 2012, FinCEN issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM),65 and in August 2014, it issued the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM).66 FinCEN promulgated the ANPRM and subsequent
NPRM for the purposes of addressing and resolving financial institutions’
inconsistent efforts at establishing CDD programs.67
The ANPRM was intended to “codify, clarify, consolidate, and
strengthen existing CDD regulatory requirements and supervisory
expectations.”68 FinCEN released this ANPRM to give financial
institutions, covered and not covered by the proposed regulation, an
opportunity to submit comments regarding FinCEN’s intention to explicitly
require the implementation of CDD programs within financial institutions.69
According to FinCEN, the need for regulation results from “[t]he
requirement that a financial institution know its customers, and the risks
presented by its customers, [which] is basic and fundamental to the
development and implementation of an effective BSA/AML compliance
program.”70 FinCEN issued its ANPRM to address the inconsistencies
62. Matthew N. Kleiman, Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized
Law Enforcement: A New Fight in an Old Battle, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1992).
63. Id.
64. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,046,
13,046 (proposed March 5, 2012) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. ch. X).
65. Id.
66. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,151,
45,152 (proposed Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
67. Id. at 45,154 (stating that “[a]t public hearings held after the comment period to the
ANPRM . . . financial institutions described widely divergent CDD practices . . . . FinCEN
believes that this disparity adversely affects efforts to mitigate risk and can promote an uneven
playing field across and within financial sectors”).
68. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. at 13,046.
69. Id. at 13,046–47. Up until the ANPRM, there has been no regulation explicitly mandating
the implementation of a specific type of CDD program. Instead, it is implicit in regulations
requiring these institutions to implement BSA compliance programs intended to comport with
recordkeeping and reporting obligations under the BSA.
70. Id.
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plaguing CDD policies across institutions, believing that its explicit CDD
rules would assist in government efforts to safeguard the country’s financial
system against financial crimes.71
The financial industry responded negatively to the ANPRM and
FinCEN subsequently conducted roundtable meetings across the country to
solicit feedback from members of the industry.72 Industry members
criticized the proposed rule for “the potential costs and practical challenges
associated with a categorical requirement to obtain beneficial ownership
information.”73 Private sector individuals emphasized primarily the burdens
an additional requirement of identifying beneficial ownership would have.
In response, on August 4, 2014, FinCEN released its NPRM, which
addressed the primary qualms of commentators, but no mention of customer
privacy rights was made in the proposed rules. Financial privacy concerns
again took a backseat as the financial sector’s focus on economic burdens
arising from the implementation of FinCEN’s regulation proved to be more
controversial.74 FinCEN rationalized the proposed regulations in the NPRM
by articulating the advantages of improved CDD requirements.75
The NPRM aims to amend existing AML requirements with “explicit
rules.”76 Before FinCEN’s NPRM, the agency’s AML regulatory
framework had four pillars that include: (i) the creation of internal policies,
procedures, and controls; (ii) the appointment of a compliance officer; (iii)
ongoing training for employees; and (iv) the implementation of an
independent audit program for purposes of testing procedures.77 The NPRM
seeks to add a fifth pillar to AML compliance programs. This fifth pillar is
intended to supplement the existing four pillars already set forth by federal
functional regulators or appointed self-regulatory organizations78 and the
BSA,79 as amended by Title III, section 352 of the Patriot Act.80 The fifth
pillar’s four elements of CDD require: (i) identification and verification of
customer identity; (ii) identification and verification of beneficial owners of
legal entities; (iii) understanding the nature and purpose of customer
71. See id. (discussing FinCEN’s belief that an explicit rule would strengthen CDD
expectations and enhance efforts to combat illicit crimes).
72. Financial Services Flash Report: FinCEN Issues Long-Awaited NPR: Beneficial
Ownership, Customer Due Diligence and a Fifth Pillar of AML Compliance, PROTIVITI (Aug. 5,
2014), http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/Regulatory-Reports/Financial-Reporting/Fina
ncial-Services-Flash-Report-FinCEN-NPR-%20Beneficial-Ownership-CDD-080514-Protiviti.pdf.
73. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,151,
45,154 (proposed Aug. 4, 2014).
74. Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights v. Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement, 6 N.C. BANKING
INST. 147, 150 (2002).
75. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,153.
76. Id. at 45,152.
77. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)–(D) (2012).
78. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,166.
79. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1).
80. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272, 322 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)).
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relationships; and (iv) ongoing monitoring and updating of customer
identification for the purposes of identifying and reporting suspicious
transactions.81 Financial institutions that must comply with the regulations
should conduct a risk-management assessment, “consistent with their
obligation to identify and report suspicious activities.”82 Explicitly adding
CDD as a fifth pillar allows FinCEN to further its mission of safeguarding
against money laundering and terrorist financing.83 FinCEN released its
final rules as this Note went to press.84 Part II explains how FinCEN’s
proposed rule fits within the broader AML regulatory framework.
II. COMPLIANCE
A. CURRENTMEASURES EMPLOYED BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Money laundering and terrorist financing are two primary reasons for
the creation of AML legislation (i.e., the BSA and the Patriot Act). Under
the BSA, financial institutions are responsible for developing and
implementing procedures to aid in the detection and prevention of money
laundering and terrorist financing.85 The goal is to deprive money
launderers and terrorists of their ability to conceal their money trail and
ultimately minimize and prevent their ability to do harm—without money,
they cannot continue their illicit crimes.86 To assist with efforts to identify
money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit activity, financial
institutions “[u]nder the [BSA], . . . must develop administer, and maintain
a program that ensures compliance with the BSA and its implementing
regulations, . . . and each federal banking agency, including the Federal
Reserve, has specific rules requiring such programs.”87
Under the traditional BSA framework, financial institutions must file a
Currency Transaction Report (CTR) for each transaction in excess of
$10,000.88 In response to 9/11 and the enactment of the Patriot Act, KYC
measures that had been considered and rejected well before 9/11 were
accepted to supplement the BSA.89 KYC has two principal components:90
“a CIP with risk-based procedures that enable the institution to form a
81. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at 45,155.
82. Id. at 45,165.
83. Id. at 45,152.
84. Customer Due Diligence for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398 (May 11, 2016)
(31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, et al.). The final rules are effective as of July 11, 2016 and
require that all covered financial institutions comply by May 11, 2018.
85. Richard D. Horn & Shelby J. Kelley, The Bank Secrecy Act: Are There Still Secrets in
Banking?, 1 PRIV. & DATA SEC. L.J. 781, 782 (2006).
86. Id.
87. BSA Hearing, supra note 58.
88. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2008).
89. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 671–72. (“The 9/11 terrorist attacks added new
political momentum to [KYC’s] consideration.”).
90. Id.
506 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of its customers”91 and
CDD.92 The obligations under a CIP include aggregation of identifying
information, verification of customer identities, maintenance of records of
all identifying information and documentation, comparison of such
identifying information with government lists, and notification to customers
that the information is required.93 To assist in the identification of
suspicious activity, financial institutions are encouraged to implement a
CDD program that determines risk levels associated with accounts and
transactions, and gathers information.94 As noted earlier, CDD “is not
mentioned in any law or regulation, but rather is imposed on [financial
institutions] by their regulators as part of the supervisory process.”95
While CIP is for customer identity verification, CDD is intended to
enable financial institutions to anticipate customer behavior and help
identify customers whose risk levels warrant the possible termination of the
business relationship.96 Financial institutions have inconsistently applied
CDD procedures because of the lack of direction and specificity regarding
what CDD programs require.97 Moreover, financial institutions with
international clientele face heightened CDD and enhanced due diligence
compliance requirements under section 312 of the Patriot Act.98 These
additional requirements include the maintenance of additional records or
reports and identification of foreign beneficial owners.99
Furthermore, financial institutions must report criminal or suspicious
activity, known or suspected, to the government by way of a suspicious
activity report.100 A suspicious activity report is required when there is: (1)
suspected “insider abuse involving any amount[;]” (2) a violation
“aggregating $5,000 or more where a suspect can be identified[;]” (3) a
violation “aggregating $25,000 or more regardless of potential suspects[;]”
or (4) a transaction “aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential
money laundering or violate the Bank Secrecy Act.”101
91. FFIECMANUAL, supra note 36, app., R-2.
92. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 672.
93. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121(b)(2)–(5).
94. BSA Hearing, supra note 58.
95. Plotkin & Sanford, supra note 30, at 677.
96. Id.
97. Id. (“[E]ach bank has been left to devise its own CDD program based on a mix of guidance
from regulators, advice from counsel and consultants, and the lessons of its own experience.”).
98. See Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions Face Challenges
Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. 395, 401–402 (2005)
(discussing more extensive due diligence procedures for foreign financial institutions).
99. Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and
the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 972 (2003) (outlining the special measures
required of financial institutions for its foreign accounts).
100. BSA Hearing, supra note 58.
101. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1)–(4) (2005).
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B. ADVENT OF TECHNOLOGY: NEW TOOLS TOASSIST WITH
REGULATIONCOMPLIANCE
FinCEN: (1) gathers financial records and data from agencies at all
levels; (2) analyzes the records and data for evidence of any financial
crimes; and (3) provides its findings to law enforcement agencies
domestically and internationally.102 Central to FinCEN’s operations is a
database that accumulates any and all information that will aid in effective
law enforcement.103 The system’s sophistication allows it to “perform as
many as eighty searches simultaneously, and can serve two hundred users at
a time.”104 FinCEN’s analytical role in helping to combat financial crimes
assists law enforcement personnel with their investigations.105 Financial
institutions simultaneously provide FinCEN and other federal supervisory
agencies with reports of suspicious activities, an activity that Congress has
recognized places a “substantial burden” on these institutions.106
Palantir has quickly “become the go-to company for mining massive
data sets for intelligence and law enforcement applications . . . [because it]
turns messy swamps of information into intuitively visualized maps,
histograms and link charts.”107 Palantir’s technological capabilities have
been actively utilized by the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army, and
even financial institutions.108 It has aided the government in “forensic
analysis of roadside bombs and predicting insurgent attacks.”109 More
recently, Palantir:
[has] emerg[ed] from the shadow world of spies and special ops to take
corporate America by storm. The same tools that can predict ambushes in
Iraq . . . [have] saved [financial institutions like JP Morgan Chase]
hundreds of millions of dollars by addressing issues from cyberfraud to
distressed mortgages. A Palantir user at a bank can, in seconds, see
connections between a Nigerian Internet protocol address, a proxy server
somewhere within the U.S. and payments flowing out from a hijacked
home equity line of credit, just as military customers piece together
fingerprints on artillery shell fragments, location data, anonymous tips and
social media to track down Afghani bombmakers.110
102. Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1190–91.
103. Id. at 1191.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1191–92.
106. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2362.
107. Andy Greenberg, How A ‘Deviant’ Philosopher Built Palantir, A CIA-Funded Data-
Mining Juggernaut, FORBESMAG. (Aug. 14, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andy
greenberg/2013/08/14/agent-of-intelligence-how-a-deviant-philosopher-built-palantir-a-cia-funde
d-data-mining-juggernaut/.
108. Vance & Stone, supra note 27.
109. Greenberg, supra note 107.
110. Id.
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In 2014, after settling insider trading charges, SAC Capital Advisors (SAC),
an asset management firm in search of ways to improve its compliance and
surveillance systems, hired Palantir.111 SAC hired Palantir to help the
company detect improper activity, while also allowing SAC to map out and
understand the varying sources of information entering the firm.112 Palantir
has also assisted JP Morgan Chase in its efforts to detect fraud.113
Palantir’s Palantir Metropolis platform,114 aids financial institutions in
ways that can be analogized to FinCEN’s efforts at aiding law enforcement
agencies. Just as FinCEN’s role is “strictly analytical,”115 Palantir
Metropolis is a data-mining platform used to analyze massive amounts of
information, and allows for “data integration, information management and
quantitative analytics. The software connects to commercial, proprietary
and public data sets and discovers trends, relationships and anomalies,
including predictive analytics.”116 The platform looks at various sources of
data to pull “disparate information into a unified quantitative analysis
environment.”117 With the data collected and evaluated by analysts, the user
is able to refer to visualizations that include charts and tables that “interact
seamlessly to provide a holistic view of all integrated data of interest.”118
The program allows for real-time updates of information and data,
providing the user with the means to analyze massive amounts of data that
require an intelligence or competitive analysis in a variety of contexts.119
Because reporting suspicious activity requires that financial institutions
review customer transactions and identify BSA reportable behavior,
Palantir can efficiently assist with the transaction monitoring that had
initially been completed manually or by other software.120 With the superior
capabilities of such a high-functioning program, however, it becomes
difficult to track threats to privacy. The deprivation of privacy that is a
111. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Cohen’s SAC Taps Analytics Firm Palantir to Monitor Employees,
REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2014), www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/hedgefunds-sac-
idUSL2N0MG22Q20140319.
112. Id.
113. A (Pretty) Complete History of Palantir, SOCIAL CALCULATIONS BLOG (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://www.socialcalculations.com/2015/08/a-pretty-complete-history-of-palantir.html.
114. Metropolis, PALANTIR, https://www.palantir.com/palantir-metropolis/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2016) [hereinafterMetropolis, PALANTIR].
115. Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1191–92 (FinCEN’s role is strictly analytical because it “first
accumulates financial records of individuals and business entities from as wide a range of sources
as possible” and then “compares these financial records with ‘models’ constructed by FinCEN
analysts designed to reflect transactional patterns indicative of money-laundering and other
financial crimes,” to be provided to law enforcement agencies.).
116. Palantir Metropolis, CRUNCHBASE, www.crunchbase.com/product/palantir-finance (last
visited on Nov. 3, 2015).
117. Metropolis, PALANTIR, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. The Palantir Technologies Model, Lights and Shadows on a Case of Success, INFOSEC
INST. (July 9, 2013) resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-palantir-technologies-model-lights-and-
shadows-on-a-case-of-success/.
120. See Horn & Kelley, supra note 85, at 791.
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concern with FinCEN,121 is also implicated because Palantir allows its
customers (e.g., the government and financial institutions) to see detailed
information about its customers.122 Part III discusses the privacy laws that
the government must consider when it tries to update its AML regulations.
III. PRIVACY
A. CURRENT FINANCIAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
Money laundering’s effects on “global financial systems” threatens
national and international security.123 Money laundering fuels illegal drug
and arms dealing, corruption, and terrorism.124 It allows criminal enterprises
to thrive and grow.125 Criminal sophistication has increased as the modern
financial services industry has become globalized and more technologically
advanced.126 Additionally, the constantly evolving threat of terrorism and
terrorist financing leads to increased vulnerabilities and makes it imperative
that the United States adapt its systems, laws, and policies to combat any
residual effects and risks posed by such criminal activity.127 These are just a
few of the justifications for requiring financial institutions to comply with
AML compliance regimes.
Unfortunately, “[t]he record keeping and reporting requirements of the
BSA have spawned a vast regulatory and law enforcement network with
unprecedented access to . . . private financial information.”128 The road to
AML compliance has not been straightforward.129 Before 9/11, government
and private groups criticized the BSA “as legislating an unjustified and
unreasonable level of federal government intrusion into the private financial
affairs of its citizens.”130 Many believed that the BSA was a “massive
financial surveillance system” that did not balance the needs of law
121. See Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1197 (discussing the debates stemming from the increased
power afforded to FinCEN for the purposes of uncover financial crimes. The government has
increased FinCEN’s powers “at the expense of individual privacy rights” and has “fueled the fires
of debate between law enforcement and privacy advocates.”).
122. Greenberg, supra note 107.
123. Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/959.htm (last visited on Feb. 20, 2016).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (“Modern financial systems, in addition to facilitating legitimate commerce, permit
criminals to order the transfer of millions of dollars instantly, using personal computers and
satellite dishes.”)




128. Horn & Kelley, supra note 85, at 781.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 785.
510 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
enforcement with those of financial institutions and their customers.131
After 9/11, however, it became more politically acceptable for the
government to increase its AML efforts, recognizing that “world stability is
increasingly threatened by sophisticated criminal organizations and their
creative implementation of money laundering schemes.”132 Logically, as a
result of 9/11, privacy became an afterthought because the protection of the
country and its citizens against terrorists was imperative.133
While implementation of an AML compliance program was a
commendable and rational policy, Congress understood that client privacy
rights needed protection too and enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy
Act) to limit the federal government’s abuse of information access.134 The
Privacy Act, however, did not go far enough—it addressed issues in privacy
law, but failed to address concerns with respect to financial privacy.135 The
Privacy Act’s reach is limited to federal agencies and does not cover private
entities, like financial institutions, which have access to significant amounts
of client information.136 This leaves great potential for continued abuse of
financial information.137 The protection of financial information is
imperative because an individual’s bank account can divulge intimate
details about that person’s life.138
In response to judicial decisions that prioritized compliance with the
BSA over financial privacy and determined that there could be no
expectation of privacy with respect to bank records,139 Congress passed the
Right to Financial Privacy Act (Financial Privacy Act) of 1978.140 The
Financial Privacy Act limited the circumstances under which financial
institutions would be able to disclose customer records to the federal
government141 (e.g., customer consent or pursuant to a subpoena).142
Additionally, it “attempt[ed] to replicate a form of constitutional
protection” by balancing a customer’s privacy interests with government
law enforcement interests.143 The Financial Privacy Act regulated the flow
131. Id.
132. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Money Laundering and Wire Transfers: When the New
Regulations Take Effect Will They Help?, 14 DICK. J. INT’L. L. 413, 413 (1996).
133. Pasley, supra note 74, at 154–55 (discussing the security changes that have resulted from
9/11).
134. Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1183.
135. See id. at 1185.
136. See id. at 1185–86.
137. Id.
138. Pasley, supra note 74, at 152.
139. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Supreme Court found no
expectation of privacy in financial records because the information contained therein has been
provided by customers in the ordinary course of business and is inherently part of commerce.
140. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697-710
(1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3401–3422 (2012)).
141. Pasley, supra note 74, at 217.
142. Gouvin, supra note 99, at 966.
143. Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1187–88
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of information between the government and financial institutions and it
required strict procedures regulating the exchange of financial information
between government agencies.144
The GLBA, also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, was legislation intended to encourage competition in the financial
industry by allowing for affiliation and information sharing among financial
institutions.145 The initial version of the GLBA did not consider customer
privacy concerns and “became a lightening [sic] rod for consumers’ fear of
their increasing loss of privacy in an electronically integrated world.”146
Debates ensued.147 The financial industry wanted fewer impediments to
their information sharing.148 Privacy proponents, on the other hand, wanted
increased customer protection with an expanded definition of what
constituted nonpublic personal information.149 What resulted was the final
version of the GLBA, with its Title V outlining the compromise between
the two sides of the privacy debate.150 Prior to the GLBA’s enactment,
federal law had failed to ensure financial privacy in any meaningful way.151
The few preexisting federal statutes (i.e., Privacy Act and Financial Privacy
Act), when considered in conjunction with common law and state law,
failed to offer sufficiently broad protections for financial privacy rights.152
The GLBA’s provisions were designed to resolve this deficiency by
requiring the establishment of “minimum federal safeguards for the capture,
use, and sharing of financial information about customers by a wide range
of businesses.”153
Title V addresses these financial privacy concerns and Subtitle A of
Title V specifically addresses financial institutions’ obligations with respect
to the disclosure of customers’ nonpublic personal information to
unaffiliated third parties.154 Under Subtitle A, financial institutions must
provide “a clear statement describing the institution’s policies and practices
with respect to the sharing of customer information with third parties, and
144. Id. at 1188–89.
145. Kathleen A. Hardee, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Five Years After Implementation, Does
the Emperor Wear Clothes?, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 915, 915 (2005).
146. Id. at 916.
147. Id.
148. Id. (“Each lawyer of safeguards was seen as an impediment to accomplishing the initial
goal of the GLBA, to facilitate the free flow of information.”).
149. Id.
150. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
151. See David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4 N.C. BANKING INST.
209 (2000) (“In most part, the concept of privacy pertaining to personal financial information has
remained legally undeveloped, and seemingly beyond public consciousness or concern.”).
152. See id. at 210 (discussing the piecemeal and inconsistent nature of existing privacy
standards on both state and federal levels).
153. Id. at 209.
154. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501–503, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436–1439
(1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
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their procedures for protecting the security and confidentiality of customer
information.”155 Financial institutions are also required to provide
customers with notice regarding the information they collect and that
customers may “opt out” of disclosure to unaffiliated third parties.156
Congress outlined these obligations, but gave administrative agencies the
responsibility of specifically outlining details for compliance with Title V
and with monitoring such compliance.157 Congress, however, provided
these agencies little guidance as to the appropriate way to implement Title
V.158
B.WHY THEGLBA IS ILLUSORY AND INSUFFICIENT
While Title V of the GLBA did assuage initial concerns about financial
privacy, it is not without criticism. First, the GLBA states that an opt-out
must be provided to customers before any nonpublic personal information
is disclosed to unaffiliated third parties, and if a customer elects to keep his
or her nonpublic personal information private, the financial institution must
honor the request.159 A customer’s inaction or failure to affirmatively opt-
out, however, provides financial institutions with implied consent to
disclose the customer’s nonpublic personal information to unaffiliated third
parties.160 Additionally, these opt-out requirements have exceptions.161
Financial institutions are allowed, for example, to disclose information
without customer consent when unaffiliated third parties have been
recruited or have contracted to perform services on its behalf.162 Financial
institutions may also share information with unaffiliated parties without
consent for “a proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of all
or a portion of a business or operating unit” and for “required institutional
risk control.”163
155. Steven R. Roach & William R. Schuerman, Jr., Privacy Year in Review: Recent
Developments in the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Other Acts
Affecting Financial Privacy, 1 I/S J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 385, 388 (2005); see also Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, §§ 501–503.
156. Roach & Schuerman, supra note 155, at 388; see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, §§ 501–
503; Hardee, supra note 145, at 919 (“The opt-out notice must be given initially when the
customer relationship is created, followed by annual privacy notices in each year in which the
customer relationship continues. These notices must disclose the types of nonpublic personal
information the financial institution collects, as well as the types of information that the financial
institution discloses to third parties. If nonpublic personal information is to be disclosed to third
parties, the financial institution must then also give its customer an ‘opt-out’ that clearly informs
the customer of his or her right to elect to keep personal information private.”).
157. Hardee, supra note 145, at 919; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 504–505.
158. Hardee, supra note 145, at 919–20.
159. Id. at 919; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502.
160. Jolina C. Cuaresma, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 497, 504
(2002).
161. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502; see also Cuaresma, supra note 160.
162. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(b)(2).
163. Id. § 502(e).
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Second, as discussed above, implementation of the GLBA is left to
administrative agencies, but Congress’s insufficient and overly general
guidance that these agencies prescribe “such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this subtitle with respect to the
financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction”164 is problematic. Banking
agencies struggled to coordinate their interagency agreement, and while
they eventually adopted joint regulations, each agency also provided its
own separate regulations.165 Federal functional regulators also collaborated
to develop regulations consistent with their obligations, but these
regulations were developed separately.166 And the GLBA has granted the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the broadest authority under the GLBA,
providing it with the “catch-all responsibility of implementation and
enforcement”167 for “any other financial institution or other person that is
not subject to the jurisdiction of any agency or authority under . . . this
subsection.”168 These agencies and federal functional regulators have broad
discretion in establishing guidelines and remedies, but there is no
overseeing body or enforcer. As a result, remedies for any infringements are
still lacking.169
Third, because 9/11 has stressed the importance of increased national
security, the GLBA explicitly provides another exception when invasions of
financial privacy are in response to “judicial process or government
regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for
examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law.”170 This
exception is an important one when reviewing the AML landscape because
it allows for unadulterated access to financial information in response to
compliance efforts. Whether such access leads to unwarranted and
unnecessary intrusions becomes an issue to consider. When federal banking
agencies proposed their initial rules for KYC in 1998, complaints against
the proposal flooded the office of federal regulators.171 Eventually, the rules
were withdrawn.172 The Patriot Act brought with it “a new version” of KYC
that presumably subjected every customer of a financial institution to CIP
and CDD.173 Additionally, the Patriot Act increased sanctions on financial
institutions for failure to comply with the provisions.174 As a result, “[f]or
customers, the scope of the intrusion [was] disconcerting; [and] for
164. Id. § 504.
165. See Hardee, supra note 145, at 921–22.
166. See id. at 924.
167. Id. at 924.
168. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 505.
169. See Roderer, supra note 151, at 213.
170. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(e)(8); see also Teitelbaum & Kaufman, supra note 21, at
1155.
171. Gouvin, supra note 99, at 969.
172. Id. at 970.
173. Id. at 970–71.
174. Id. at 972.
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financial institutions, the consequences of non-compliance [were]
staggering.”175 Despite the potential for privacy intrusions, these actions are
covered by the GLBA’s exception.176
The creation of FinCEN, for the purpose of assisting law enforcement
investigation of financial crimes177 caused more debate between
government officials and advocates of privacy rights.178 What resulted were
“several legislative and administrative attempts to confer greater powers
upon the agency . . . seek[ing] to eliminate statutory restrictions on
FinCEN’s operations by amending the federal privacy statutes which
govern administrative use of personal financial information.”179 Again,
privacy rights were sacrificed for the furtherance of FinCEN’s objectives.180
FinCEN overcame any statutory or regulatory hurdles in favor of privacy
rights and most recently proposed rules that add CDD as a fifth pillar to
BSA compliance.181 This further implicates issues regarding privacy
intrusions. The proposed rule explicitly mandates identification and
customer verification (including beneficial owners), and requires financial
institutions to understand the rationale for customer relationships while
simultaneously conducting ongoing monitoring.182 This rule will advance
consistent implementation of CDD efforts across financial institutions,183
but disregards privacy. Prior to 9/11, KYC regulations were criticized for
“inappropriately and unnecessarily infring[ing] on the privacy rights of
bank customers.”184 Despite this criticism, regulators have enforced KYC
regulations without the substantial modifications that groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union have requested.185
Concerns about the burdens on financial institutions186 will not subside
because these rules require additional verification and identification of
beneficial owners and continued monitoring and reporting of suspicious
transactions.187 With these continued (and arguably increased) obligations
on financial institutions, the need for more efficient or sophisticated
technological programs that assist with the identification, monitoring, and
175. Horn & Kelley, supra note 85.
176. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502(8), 113 Stat. 1338, 1438–1439
(1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6802); see also Teitelbaum & Kaufman, supra note 21, at 1155.
177. Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1172.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1173.
180. Id. at 1174.
181. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,151,
45,166 (proposed Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
182. Id. at 45,152.
183. Id. at 45,153.
184. Financial Privacy Hearing, supra note 41.
185. Id.
186. Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2338.
187. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,151,
45,152.
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reporting requirements will only become more obvious. This will result in
the continued reliance on programs like Palantir Metropolis and similar
platforms, which have the ability to access vast amounts of information
instantly across national and international borders.
As a result, the sophistication of technology will continue to affect
privacy protection.188 This leads to the last problem to address: money
laundering and terrorist financing are global in nature, which makes it
necessary for the United States to work with the rest of the world to ensure
that its efforts are in concert with international efforts.189 This is not limited
to rules and regulations related to illegal financial activities. The United
States is behind in its efforts to protect its citizens’ right to privacy, as its
privacy regime is far less protective in comparison to international privacy
laws.190
International financial crimes involve a level of complexity that
requires a joint effort by all nations to gather and analyze data from various
sources, both domestically and abroad.191 Financial institutions will need
software like Palantir’s to aid in its compliance efforts, which proves
problematic and terrifying precisely because it is a program that works so
well and provides its clients with access to a wide range of information.192
The program’s ability to assist its clients in their surveillance efforts and to
assist in mining massive amounts of data has become a great concern to
privacy advocates, resulting in the prospect of a “true totalitarian nightmare,
monitoring the activities of innocent Americans on a mass scale.”193 In
response to concerns about the increased risk to privacy created by using
programs like those developed by Palantir, Palantir has itself assembled the
Palantir Council of Advisors on Privacy and Civil Liberties, a group of
experts working together to address privacy issues arising with the
platform’s continued use and development.194 Palantir, acknowledging the
importance of privacy and civil liberties, has made the protection of these
188. Kleiman, supra note 62, at 1171–72 (“Increasing hardware capacities, growing software
sophistication, and innovative application of existing technologies have undermined attempts to
create a stable framework of privacy protection.”).
189. Roach, supra note 155, at 435 (“The challenges facing the United States in preventing
illegal financing are enormously complex and encompass numerous organizations throughout the
world. Current U.S. statutes appear sufficient to regulate and monitor formal financial institutions
in U.S. and Western Europe, but struggle to maintain the same control over the informal networks
found elsewhere in the world.”).
190. See Kyle T. Sammin, Any Port in a Storm: The Safe Harbor, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, and the Problem of Privacy in Financial Services, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 653, 653
(2004).
191. Roach, supra note 155, at 435.
192. Greenberg, supra note 107.
193. Id.
194. John Grant, Going International With the Palantir Council of Advisors on Privacy and
Civil Liberties, PALANTIR (Jan. 29, 2014), https://www.palantir.com/2014/01/going-international-
with-the-palantir-council-of-advisors-on-privacy-and-civil-liberties/.
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rights a core commitment.195 Unfortunately, Palantir’s efforts alone are
insufficient to protect privacy—the government must also act.
Technology will continue to advance and more programs will be
developed to assist with data collection and monitoring on a global scale. It
is therefore important and necessary to consider how international privacy
laws are implicated. The European Union (EU) and the United States have
long had fundamentally different views on privacy, with the EU placing
greater value on an individual’s human right to privacy. The EU’s Data
Privacy Directive requires companies operating in the EU or using the data
of the EU’s citizens to comply with its privacy regulations as standardized
by the data privacy laws of its Member States.196
The EU and the United States established a Safe Harbor Agreement
(Safe Harbor) that permits continued trade between the two, while allowing
for compromise with respect to the EU Data Privacy Directive’s
requirements.197 The Safe Harbor did not require modification to U.S.
privacy laws, but instead, required that U.S. companies self-certify their
self-enforcement of data protection schemes that would provide privacy
protections equivalent to those that the EU Data Privacy Directive
provides.198 This Safe Harbor applied only to those companies under the
jurisdiction of the FTC and the Department of Transportation, and excluded
the financial services industry.199 Despite this exclusion, the EU declared
that the GLBA was insufficient when compared to the requirements
established under the Safe Harbor.200
Even more problematic than the EU’s unwillingness to view the GLBA
as sufficient financial privacy protection201 was the European Court of
Justice’s recent invalidation of the 15-year-old Safe Harbor.202 The EU’s
disapproval of U.S. privacy protections and the resulting invalidation of the
only legal mechanism in place to protect extraterritorial data transfers
makes it even more imperative that privacy regulations, including the
GLBA, be reconsidered and modified.
195. PALANTIR TECHS., A CORE COMMITMENT PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(2012), https://www.palantir.com/wp-assets/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ProtectingPrivacy_Civil
Liberties_2012.pdf.
196. See Sammin, supra note 190, at 653.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 657–58.
199. Id. at 654–58.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 117/15, The Court of Justice
Declares That the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf.
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C. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION FOR THE PRIVACY PROBLEM
KYC regulations and FinCEN’s proposed rules continuously require
financial institutions to gather information about their customers, to create
risk profiles, and determine trends in their behavior.203 Regulations also
necessitate the monitoring of transactions so that financial institutions may
report suspicious activity.204 FinCEN’s recent rules were proposed with no
mention of customer privacy rights, indicating that these enforcement
efforts will likely continue on course, to the detriment of customers.
FinCEN’s justifications are rational: it seeks to promote consistent efforts at
implementation within financial sectors; it seeks to aid law enforcement and
regulators in obtaining information necessary for their examinations and
investigations; it hopes to help financial institutions “assess and mitigate
risk” as they work to comply with AML requirements; and it ultimately
seeks to aid in the identification of accounts linked to illicit crimes and
national security threats.205 Unfortunately, though the goals of these rules
are commendable, the rules themselves are not complete.
Customer privacy rights have consistently taken a backseat to the goals
of AML compliance and economic efficiency.206 While the GLBA was a
step in the direction of reconsidering financial privacy, the need for
information continues to trump privacy considerations,207 especially after
considering all of the GLBA’s shortcomings.208 “[T]he momentum for
increased privacy rights [came] to a halt in light of the . . . concern over
national security.”209 FinCEN’s proposed rules continue to further the
message that privacy will not be a primary consideration for financial
institutions, if a consideration at all. To work toward resolving the lack of
attention to privacy rights, regulators should modify the AML framework to
specifically address financial privacy.
Currently, the first four pillars are concerned with compliance efforts
and in ensuring that financial institutions are complying with regulations.210
The fifth pillar, as proposed by FinCEN, further solidifies compliance
requirements.211 Unfortunately, these five pillars, when taken in totality,
still fail to address and resolve the negative effects that these compliance
procedures will have against the financial privacy rights of customers; they
fall short because they fail to address or provide privacy protections.
203. See Horn, supra note 85, at 787.
204. Id. at 791.
205. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,151,
45,153 (proposed Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
206. See Cuaresma, supra note 160, at 510.
207. Id. at 515.
208. See supra Part III.B.
209. Cuaresma, supra note 160, at 517.
210. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at
45,166.
211. See id.
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This being the case, a sixth pillar of AML privacy compliance can be
added to work hand-in-hand with the other five. This sixth pillar should be
mirrored after the FTC’s GLBA regulations, and more specifically, its
Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information (Safeguards Rule).212
The FTC’s Safeguards Rule requires that financial institutions develop and
describe to customers its program for protecting customer information.213
FinCEN should mirror the elements of the Safeguards Rule to establish
privacy safeguards and procedures that are cognizant of the compliance
requirements of the AML framework, while simultaneously ensuring that
the access to and reporting of this information is not done in a way that
overreaches and neglects privacy rights.
The proposed sixth pillar would require that Chief Compliance
Officer’s within financial institutions appoint, and work hand-in-hand with,
either a Chief Privacy and Information Officer or employees specifically
designated to focus on privacy and security issues. These privacy
employees will be responsible for monitoring compliance programs for
risks and inadequacies and for implementing measures to ensure their
conformity with current privacy regulations, at both the domestic and
international levels. In light of the enhanced due diligence requirement with
respect to foreign clients,214 it is imperative that privacy employees within
these institutions are also specialists in the privacy laws of other nations to
guarantee compliance with regulations beyond those of the AML regime of
the United States.
Additionally, these privacy employees should assist in transparency
efforts for the sake of increasing customer awareness, and they should be
responsible for ensuring that the scope of compliance programs does not
reach beyond what is necessitated by law—that the information gathered is
not used for purposes outside the scope of compliance with AML
regulations. This will require that privacy groups also review the processes
and procedures employed by their service providers to ensure that all
service providers implement and maintain consistent safeguards. Privacy
teams must work with compliance groups to ensure that the efforts are
handled seamlessly. Beyond their work within the financial institutions,
privacy officers should be required to annually certify the propriety of their
privacy program—a designated body should also be created to review these
certifications.
Until the federal government prioritizes financial privacy by requiring
that government agencies and officials work closely with private sector
individuals and international regimes to ensure uniform and sound privacy
programs, starting with financial institutions directly seems like a necessary
212. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2002).
213. Id.
214. Sorcher, supra note 98, at 402.
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and proactive start. While the financial costs associated with hiring these
officers and employees may be burdensome, it will be a positive step in
ensuring that privacy, and even security, is addressed in anticipation of the
constantly evolving privacy landscape.
CONCLUSION
Terrorism, money laundering, and illicit crimes have not subsided and
have instead invaded global markets.215 The inherently global nature of
these illicit activities has necessitated the implementation of a robust AML
compliance regime within financial institutions.216 The policies and
rationale are logical—it is important to ensure that financial institutions are
protected against and not aiding in the abuses of terrorist organizations and
money launderers.217
However, with compliance comes the potential risk that financial
institutions seeking to avoid any penalties associated with failed compliance
will gather information beyond the scope of what is necessitated by law.
This risk can be further exacerbated by the capabilities of the technology
that is aiding these financial institutions in their compliance efforts.218 What
results is an inadequate regulatory framework that addresses AML
compliance and privacy protection separately, rather than concurrently.
Because information, and more specifically, financial data, is intrinsically
extraterritorial, the two regimes can no longer work independently. AML
regulation is undoubtedly necessary and important, but privacy rights are
also important. Financial privacy need not be sacrificed for the sake of
compliance with regulations. Palantir has taken steps to commit itself to
privacy and civil liberties efforts and the U.S. government should do the
same.219 Regulators should similarly work with privacy advocates in
resolving these tensions.
Unfortunately, in light of the continuous debate over privacy and
financial privacy, a sound resolution for the United States does not seem
imminent. Until multinational reconciliation of these two regulatory
frameworks—AML regulation and privacy regulation—can be
accomplished, FinCEN should take steps to enhance and improve its AML
framework by accounting for customer privacy rights. A sixth pillar should
be added to FinCEN’s proposed rules; one that will require that financial
institutions employ privacy specialists who will be responsible for auditing
internal and external programs, as well as developing safeguards to
minimize risks, and who will be constantly vigilant of AML, privacy issues,
215. See generallyMoney Laundering and Financial Crimes, supra note 123.
216. See id.; see also NTFRA, supra note 127.
217. See Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, supra note 123; see also NTFRA, supra
note 127.
218. See supra Part II.B.
219. See generally Grant, supra note 194.
520 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
and laws domestically and abroad to ensure that regulatory compliance
satisfies the transnational nature of both.
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